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Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 
2005 Analysis Contributors and Complexity 
Dr Craig E. College, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army, craig.college@us.army.mil 
COL William J. Tarantino, Ph.D., Naval Postgraduate School, william.tarantino@us.army.mil 
Whenever we engage in a study like BRAC, which lasted over 
two and a half years, required 
hundreds of man-years of energy, and will 
significantly impact the Army for decades, it 
is appropriate to thank those involved and 
provide some insights for those that follow 
us. In this article, we discuss some of the 
analytical support the Army received during 
BRAC recommendation development, prob-
lem complexities, and highlight items of 
interest. 
Over the last few years, Dr Craig College 
had the privilege of representing the Army 
within BRAC circles as the Director of The 
Army Basing Study (TABS). His office 
completed the Army's BRAC analysis and is 
now supporting general infrastructure analy-
sis across the Army. Up until now, the Army, 
along with the other Services and the Joint 
Cross Service Groups (JCSGs ), published its 
BRAC Report and numerous supporting 
documents on the World Wide Web. Most 
will not have time to read all of the analyses 
that were developed for BRAC; this article 
highlights for the reader some of the more 
influential analyses and the organizations 
that contributed. 
To begin this discussion, let's briefly 
consider the background for the BRAC 
effort and the structure that the Army faced 
within this large study. 
Background 
From January 2003 through May 2005, 
the Army undertook the BRAC 2005 analy-
sis effort. In the beginning, the Army was 
uncertain about how extensive an effort was 
desired from BRAC 2005. The Secretary of 
Defense saw the effort as an important 
opportunity to lead change, stating that, 
while BRAC 2005 must continue to pursue 
the reduction of surplus as was true in pre-
vious BRAC rounds. 
BRAC can make an even more profound 
contribution to transforming the Depart- · 
ment by rationalizing our infrastructure 
with defense strategy. BRAC 2005 
should be the means by which we recon-
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Figure 1. BRAC 2005 DoD Organization. The BRAC SRG approved the Army 
BRAC recommendations and forwarded them through the Secretary of the Army to 
the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the DoD recommendations that went before 
the BRAC Commission. TABS collected data, provided analysis, and developed the 
Army BRAC recommendations f~r the SRG. 
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figure our current infrastructure into one 
in which operational capacity maximizes 
both war fighting capability and effi-
ciency. 
The Secretary of Defense also empha-
sized that the Department of Defense (DoD) 
should examine and implement opportuni-
ties for greater Joint activity among the Mil-
itary Departments. (SECDEF, 15 Novem-
ber 2002)1 
The result of the Army's BRAC 2005 
selection process is a streamlined installa-
tion portfolio of predominantly multiuse 
installations that optimizes Military Value 
and reduces cost of ownership; facilitates 
transformation, joint operations, and joint 
business functions; accommodates rebasing 
of overseas units as part of the Integrated 
Global Presence and Basing Strategy; and 
divests itself of an accumulation of installa-
tions that are no longer relevant and are less 
effective in supporting a Joint and Expedi-
tionary Army. 
BRAC 2005 Organization 
The Secretary of Defense received can-
didate BRAC recommendations from the 
Infrastructure Steering Group and each Ser-
vice (Figure 1 ). The organization and analy-
sis for each Service differed substantially 
[Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission 2005).2 The Army Senior 
Review Group (SRG) oversaw all aspects 
of Army analysis. Dr Craig College report-
ed directly to the SRG. COL Kurt Weaver 
was the TABS Deputy; he provided leader-
ship for internal integration across the staff 
and external integration across those organ-
izations in Figure I. Primary analytical sup-
port came from CAA, USMA and NPS. 
Many other agencies provided expert advice 
and analysis. 
In addition to the Service efforts, seven 
functionally-aligned JCSGs assessed indi-
vidual functions and reported their recom-
mendations to the ISG. TABS collaborated 
with the other Services, the JCSGs, and the 
Army Reserve and Army National Guard 
components when BRAC interests over-
lapped. 
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Figure 2. TABS Internal Organization 
The Analysis: Internal Capability DoD Report . COL Tom Crabtree was not 
an ORSA, but Tom quickly became one as he 
tackled the numerous environmental studies 
and analyses required to support all of the 
environmental requirements for TABS. 
The Army Audit Agency, JCSG represen-
tatives, and Trusted Agents (subject matter 
experts) supported our analyses from the 
quality, joint, and mission perspectives. 
Although all of our staff was not "school 
trained" in operations research, the entire staff 
underwent an intense education process 
where they learned the basics of many of the 
methods outlined below and, more impor-
tantly, learned how to apply the analytical 
results· to develop quality recommendations 
for the Army. We commend each of them for 
a job well done and recognize their analytical 
achievements and contributions. 
The Analysis: Supporting Agencies 
The analysis was complex; we coordinat-
ed and integrated analysis that included over 
50 individual studies. Each of these studies 
provided a piece of the puzzle and might have 
influenced several different final recommen-
dations. Figure 3 provides a partial listing of 
the different methods we used for the three 
major analyses: Military Value, Capacity, and 
Stationing. 
With such a large body of required analy-
ses and a diverse array of methods, TABS 
needed to reach out and ask the Army Staff 
and agencies for their support. We mention 
some of those staff here (all referenced stud-
ies, interviews, and analysis can be found 
within the Army's BRAC Report and sup-
porting documents): 
1. Center for Army Analysis - Major Lee 
Ewing, CAA, provided the technical sup-
port on all decision analysis and opti-
mization required for Military Value. He 
led a team of analysts that helped to devel-
op the data management, spreadsheet 
analysis, trend work for the Army Capac-
ity analysis, and provided a significant 
what-if capability throughout the study 
period. CAA conducted several large 
studies, for example, individual efforts on 
critical infrastructure, statistical analysis 
on BRAC 1995 Military VaJue, and an 
(See BRAC,p. 8) 
The primary analytical effort was com-
pleted by the Modeling Team, which provid-
ed an in-house operations research capabili-
ty and was responsible for coordinating the 
myriad of analyses that supported TABS ( see 
Figure 2). COL Bill Tarantino led this team 
and was responsible for all analyses, integra-
tion across agencies, quality control, and 
report writing. The Data Team managed a 
considerable amount of data that fed models 
and scenario analysis. Mr Larry Wright led 
this Team, which was instrumental in pro-
viding the certified level of data to support 
BRAC. Pat McCullough led the Mission 
Team, which consisted of subject matter 
experts in maneuver, schools, etc., and devel-
oped recommendations based on analysis 
results. 
Military Value Capacity Stationing 
Our internal operations research capabili-
ty included three school-trained Operations 
Researchers/Systems Analysts (ORSAs). 
Besides COL Tarantino, TABS had Major 
Dave Smith, who came to TABS from West 
Point and became the Army's and DoD's 
expert on the Cost of Base Realignment and 
Closure Action model (COBRA). Dave also 
completed numerous internal studies and pro-
vided the quality control for many supporting 
efforts. Dr Chien Huo provided internal 
operations research support and came from 
Army G8. Chien became the TABS expert on 
test facilities and completed the initial Capac-
ity Analysis work for both TABS and the 
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Decision analysis Trend analysis Optimization 
Optimization Spreadsheet Cost estimation 
Geospatial analysis Database management Time value of money 
Deployment analysis Requirements process Economics 
Information Technology analysis Institutional database systems Operational requirements 
Data analysis 
Environmental analysis 
Force structure and manpower analysis 
Uncertainty and risk analysis 
Presentation and marketing analysis 
Figure 3. Analysis Techniques and Subjects for BRAC (models using 




optimization model on the impact of 
BRAC on the Reserve and National Guard 
training capability. CAA also provided 
support prior to BRAC commencing by 
developing analytical tools and other 
capabilities to support BRAC 2005. 
2. United States Military Academy - Dr 
Greg Parnell, FS (and others) from the 
USMA Systems Engineering Department 
was instrumental in the development and 
application of the decision analysis that 
supported Military Value analysis. Greg 
also led two Cadet Capstone projects that 
helped define part of the complexity of 
BRAC implementation. Others at USMA 
also provided supporting studies, for 
example, COL Casey Wardynski of the 
Social Sciences Department studied the 
work force availability across Army instal-
lations. 
3. Naval Postgraduate School - Dr Rob 
Dell at NPS started supporting BRAC 
2005 in 2001, while assisting CAA with 
the development of optimization tools 
to support Stationing Analysis. During 
BRAC 2005, he assisted with many 
optimizations related studies including 
possible post-BRAC implementation 
approaches. 
4. The Army Staff - Assistant Chief of Staff 
for Installation Management (ACSIM) 
provided institutional database systems 
that supported Capacity Analysis and 
many subject matter experts that were 
essential within Military Value and the 
Capacity analysis. These data and experts 
were essential to a successful effort. The 
Army G 1, G2, G3, G4, G6, and GS all pro-
vided subject matter experts in their areas 
and much needed assistance on Army 
force structure and the Army's require-
ments process, especially operational and 
estimates for future requirements. The G6 
provided support for information technol-
ogy and built systems to assist with esti-
mating information infrastructure require-
ments and the connectivity at different 
installations. 
5. Construction Engineering Research 
Laboratory - CERL provided significant 
support for geospatial analysis that 
impacted Military Value, numerous envi-
ronmental areas, for example, encroach-
ment, soil, water, air quality, and other 
analyses, and like CAA, provided a what-
if capability for Stationing analysis. Bill 
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Goran at CERL provided an effective link 
to the expertise TABS needed in all of the 
above environmental areas. 
6. Military Surface Deployment and Dis-
tribution Command (Transportation 
Engineering Agency) - Dr Mike 
Cochrane and Mr Thomas Jernigan pro-
vided the deployment analysis for TABS 
Military Value analysis. Their products 
also provided an efficient what-if capabil-
ity. 
All of the above (and many other) Army 
agencies and staff contributed to the BRAC 
2005 analysis. In addition, TABS conducted 
stakeholder interviews with senior Army and 
Defense leaders to obtain, their views on 
BRAC 2005 objectives, priorities, challenges, 
and transformational or cost reduction oppor-
tunities. We interviewed thirty-six senior 
Army leaders (General or civilian equivalent-
level officers) and their staffs. TABS also had 
a network of subject matter experts across the 
staff of over 100 individuals, coordinated and 
integrated the analysis and recommendations 
of the Air Force, Navy, and JCSGs, that 
touched the Army and had superb contractor 
support throughout the effort. 
BRAC 2005 Outcomes3 
The BRAC 2005 recommendations of the 
Secretary of Defense (as approved by the 
BRAC 2005 Commission, President of the 
United States, and the Congress) close, 
realign, or add functions at 72 of the 97 instal-
lations on the Army's study list. The recom-
mendations close 13 Army posts, 6 lease sites, 
176 US Army Reserve Readiness Centers, 
and enable State Governors to close 211 
armories and readiness centers if they choose 
to move those units into one of the 125 local 
Armed Forces Readiness Centers, which are 
also contained in the recommendations of the 
Secretary of Defense. In addition, 35 Army 
installations are realigned under these rec-
ommendations. 
The Army's BRAC 2005 actions are larg-
er than the Army actions of all four previous 
BRAC rounds combined. While projected 
implementation costs are larger than previous 
Army BRAC rounds, the savings are also 
greater. 
The Army's cost of ownership will be 
reduced by $1.5B annually, and 20-year net 
savings will be 1.2 times larger than those of 
the Army actions of the four previous BRAC 
rounds. The total economic story (including 
savings generated by overseas moves) is a 
steady-state annual savings of $2.5B with a 
8 
20-year net savings 4.3 times larger than 
those of Army actions of the four previous 
BRAC rounds. 
Final Thoughts 
The BRAC analysis was a complex 
effort. TABS reached out and touched hun-
dreds of subject matter experts throughout 
the staff and supporting agencies. Army 
BRAC 2005 is an example of a complex, 
well thought-through analysis that the senior 
leaders of the Army supported, and had the 
resources to find the analytical wherewithal 
it needed to complete required tasks. Qual-
ity analysis informed decision makers. 
These senior decision makers supported 
TABS and its desire to lead change within 
the BRAC process and support transforma-
tion. Thanks to all of those that contributed 
to this analysis and their agencies' leadership 
that supported this effort. 
References 
1. Secretary of Defense. "Transformation 
Through Base Realignment and Closure" 
Memorandum. Washington DC Novem-
ber 2002. 
2. Defense Base Closure and Realignment 
Commission 2005, "Defense Base Clo-
sure and Realignment Commission: 
Report to the President," Department of 
Defense. August 2005. 
3. Department of the Army 2005, "Depart-
ment oftheArmy-BRAC 2005-Analysis 
and Recommendations," Department of 
Defense. May 2005. 
Three Internet sites provide additional detail 
on DoD and Army BRAC 2005 analysis and 
conclusions. 
• http://www.brac.gov. Sponsored by the 
President's BRAC Commission. Includes 
deliberative documents used by the Com-
mission, including their final recommen-
dations to the President. 
• http://www.dod.mil/brac. Sponsored by 
the Office of the Secretary of Defense. 
Includes deliberative documents used by 
the DoD for BRAC, including its final rec-
ommendations to the BRAC Commission. 
• http: //www.hqda.army.mil/acsim/ 
brac/index.htrn. Sponsored by Depart-
ment of the Army and maintained by the 
Assistant Chief of Staff for Installation 
Management within Department of the 
Army. Includes a host of documents per-
taining to analysis and implementation of 
BRACs past and present. 0 
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